GARRY KASPAROV ON GARRY KASPAROV

PART II: 1985-1993

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Foreword

This second volume of the autobiographical trilogy *Garry Kasparov on Garry Kasparov* contains one hundred of the most memorable games and endings played during the eight years when I was FIDE champion (1985-1993). This period was the peak of my playing career, as is confirmed by both my competitive results, and the quality of the games.

The era described was an extremely tense and most unusual one for me. In the first four years, from the moment when I won the title of world champion (November 1985) until the conquering of the 2805 rating (November 1989), a cosmic figure for those times, I consolidated my domination in the world chess arena. I twice defended my champion's title in dramatic matches with Anatoly Karpov (1986 and 1987), took or at least shared first place in all the tournaments in which I participated, and convincingly won the tournament championship of the planet – the World Cup (1988-1989).

However, the year 1990 began with tragic, extraordinary events. Returning to Baku after lengthy wanderings abroad, I found myself in the very thick of an ethnic conflict – the Armenian pogroms. My mother and I as well as our relatives had to take flight. Thus in the year of the next match for the world championship I was suddenly deprived of both my native home, and my long-standing training base in Zagulba. This was a severe psychological blow, the collapse of my entire customary way of life.

Not surprisingly, at precisely that time my battle with FIDE for the rights of chess players and with the USSR State Sports Committee for professional sport grew into a battle for changes in the country. After settling in Moscow I became an active political figure, inspired by the ideas of Andrey Dmitrievich Sakharov (our acquaintance, unfortunately, was very short-lived).

There were also substantial changes to the composition of my training team, with which I prepared for my fifth match with Karpov. Nikitin departed and, with the exception of Shakarov, no one remained from those who were with me on my way to the chess crown. In this sense too, the 1990 match also became an historic landmark. Despite all the upheavals, I

managed to win it, but the history of the legendary team of the 1980s had come to an end: from then on completely new people appeared in it.

From the early 1990s talented young players began assuming the leading roles in chess (Anand, Ivanchuk, Gelfand, Short, Kamsky, Shirov, Topalov), and Karpov and I were no longer able to dominate as we had done before. Paradoxically, in 1991 in none of the supertournaments in Linares, Amsterdam and Reggio Emilia did either of us take first place! But by effort of will I was able to break the negative trend. With the help of Sergey Makarychev I renovated my opening repertoire – and I won not only Tilburg 1991, but also Linares two years in succession (1992 and 1993).

On this occasion my domination in the chess arena lasted less than two years, but on the other hand this time was perhaps the most fruitful in the creative respect. In clashes with young, inventive and tenacious opponents, some brilliant and unforgettable games were created.

In February 1993 Nigel Short, the winner of the next qualifying cycle, unexpectedly suggested to me that we should play our match for the world championship outside of the FIDE framework. Thinking that this would be a convenient opportunity to at last put chess on a professional basis, I agreed. Because of the rapid rehabilitation after the crisis of 1991, my sense of danger had evidently been dulled. The moment chosen for the declaration of war on FIDE was unfortunate, and the decision taken proved to be a mistake with far-reaching consequences.

In response FIDE President Campomanes took an unprecedented step: stripping me and Short of our rights of champion and challenger, he arranged a match 'for the world championship' between the two reserve candidates who had lost to Short in the qualifying cycle – Timman and Karpov. A new spiral in chess history began...

I should like to express my gratitude to my former trainers Alexander Nikitin and Alexander Shakarov, and also the chess compilers Vladislav Novikov and Yakov Zusmanovich, for their help in preparing the manuscript for publication.

Chapter Three

Fall and Rise

Challenge to the Champions

International Tournament in Linares (22 February – 15 March 1991): 1. Ivanchuk – 9½ out of 13; 2. **Kasparov** – 9; 3. Beliavsky – 8; 4–5. Yusupov and Speelman – 7½; 6. Salov – 7; 7–8. Timman and Karpov – 6½; 9–11. Ljubojevic, Anand and M.Gurevich – 6; 12. Gelfand – 5½; 13. Ehlvest – 3½; 14. Kamsky – 2½.

As the chess experts had predicted, at the start of the 1990s a farewell was bid to the generation of the Fischer era and new stars joined the battle with the Karpov and Kasparov generations. They announced their presence in the summer of 1990 at the Interzonal Tournament in Manila (1–2. Gelfand and Ivanchuk – 9 out of 13; 3–4. Short and Anand – 8½, etc), in January 1991 they all won their Candidates matches (Ivanchuk's win over Yudasin was especially impressive – 4½-½1), and then they challenged the strongest players in the world at the ninth, traditional tournament in Linares.

It was this event that began the history of annual super-tournaments of fourteen leading grandmasters – events of the highest category, which the journalists aptly christened the 'chess Wimbledon'. As the press remarked, 'here, for the first time, the two inseparable "Ks" played together with both of their "predicted rivals" – Vassily Ivanchuk and Boris Gelfand, while among the other contestants were only Candidates of the present world championship cycle and finalists of the second World Cup. The only place "not by ranking" was allotted to the young Gata Kamsky, and he very much felt the heavy hand of his senior colleagues.'

During the opening ceremony, apart from the usual drawing of lots, the pairings for the Candidates quarter-final matches were also made. As in the previous cycle, Karpov joined the proceedings at this stage. I remember how he literally beamed with delight when he 'drew' the 21-year-old Vishy Anand (the other pairings were Ivanchuk-Yusupov, Gelfand-Short and Timman-Korchnoi). For the first time Karpov had a match opponent who was young enough to be his son! It seemed improbable that the very talented and promising, but as yet too young and inexperienced Indian grandmaster would be able to put up

a serious resistance against the great Anatoly Karpov. It would appear that the exchampion did not imagine what a dangerous opponent fate had assigned him – but perhaps he began to gain an insight when he lost his game to Anand with White in the 2nd round.

In the first round I was paired with Black against Ivanchuk. He flew in late in the evening, was late for the opening ceremony, and the next day he played against me 1 e4 c5 2 \$\overline{2}\$f3 d6 3 \$\overline{2}\$b5+. I thought that it was probably in order to obtain a solid position. But I played uncertainly, whereas, by contrast, Vassily played very strongly – and his win was fully deserved. As it later transpired, this game decided the outcome of the battle for first place. For me it was a warning signal: for the first time in ten years of tournament play I lost not as a result of some oversight, but because I was outplayed by my opponent.

In the 2nd round I won a very complicated game against Gelfand, and also subsequently points were gained with great difficulty. Only by the 8th round, after beating Gurevich and Kamsky, and drawing with Timman, Speelman and Salov, did I reach a more or less respectable 'plus two'. And here I had Black against Karpov, who had also lost to Ivanchuk and was on just 'minus one': what told on his play was the enormous fatigue that had accumulated after our match and his January victory in the double-round tournament in Reggio Emilia. But I was happy with a draw, since without particular exertion I was able to solve my opening problems - a good sign, after a match that had been so difficult for Black (Game No.32 in Kasparov vs. Karpov 1988-2009).

That same evening Beliavsky won against Timman, and Ivanchuk against Anand, and


the two leaders increased the gap between them and their pursuers: Beliavsky – 6½ out of 8 (!); Ivanchuk – 6; Kasparov – 5, etc.

In the 9th round I had White against the formidable Alexander Beliavsky, and to retain chances of first place in the tournament I had to win 'to order'. The game took place after a free day, so that each of us had time for preparation. A particular piquancy was added to the situation by our recent analytical collaboration before my match with Karpov.

Game 75 G.Kasparov-A.Beliavsky Linares, 9th Round, 8.03.1991 English Opening A19

1 c4 e6 2 \bigcirc **c3** \bigcirc **f6** (for some reason my opponent rejected 2...d5 and his customary Oueen's Gambit) **3 e4 c5 4 e5** \bigcirc **g8 5** \bigcirc **f3**

5...公c6 6 d4 cxd4 7 公xd4 公xe5 8 公db5 a6 9 公d6+ 鱼xd6 10 營xd6 f6 11 鱼e3 公e7 12 鱼b6 公f5 13 營c5!? d6 14 營a5




Up to here this was a repetition of my Belfort game with Andrey Sokolov, and I was pleased by Beliavsky's choice: White has good compensation for the pawn, and his active piece play gives him more winning chances than strict manoeuvring in the classical set-ups of the Queen's Gambit.

14... ■d7!? (but here is a new move instead of the previous 14... **■e7** – *Game No.40*) **15 f4!** (15 0-0-0 **■c6!**) **15... △c6**

Of course, with gain of tempo. 15...2g4?! 16 2e2! or 15...2g6?! 16 2e3! with the threat of 2xf5 is worse.

16 **₩**a3

A critical moment.



16...e5?

A mistake, leading to great difficulties on account of the weakness of the d5-point, whereas it is not possible to exploit the d4-point. Soon the correct defence was found – 16... Ce7! 17 0-0-0 Wc6 with sharp play. After 18 Wb3 White retains pressure, and Black his extra pawn: 18... d7 19 Ig1 d5 (19...h5!?) 20 b1! (20 g4 d6 21 cxd5 xd5 is not so clear, Psakhis-A.Greenfeld, Israel 1991) or 18...0-0 19 Ig1 d5 20 g4 d6 21 c5 (21 Wb4 E8) 21... f7 22 gg2 (L'Ami-Wells, London 2008).

17 **≜**d3!

It would appear that Beliavsky was hop-


ing for 17 0-0-0?! exf4 18 \triangle d5 0-0, which is quite acceptable for Black, and he underestimated my reply, which intends 0-0.

17...0-0

17...exf4 is no better: 18 0-0 g5 (my Informator suggestion 18... \bigcirc e5(?) is fatal on account of 19 \bigcirc xf5 \bigcirc xf5 20 \bigcirc d5 \bigcirc f7 21 \bigcirc xf4 etc) 19 \bigcirc ae1+ \bigcirc f7 20 \bigcirc d5 (more energetic than 20 \bigcirc xf5 \bigcirc xf5 21 \bigcirc e4) 20... \bigcirc e5 21 \bigcirc e4 or 21 g3!? with an escalating attack.

18 0-0 exf4

19 \(\bar{2}\) xf4 \(\bar{2}\) fe7 20 \(\bar{2}\) d1



Now White concentrates his efforts on eliminating the d6-pawn. The pair of powerful bishops guarantees him an enduring initiative.

20...**②g6 21 ☐ff1 ②ge5**

22 & e4 \(\delta\)f7 23 b3 & e6 24 \(\delta\)xd6

With the threat of 40d5. The centralisa-

tion of the queen is more appropriate than 24 Ξ xd6, although the immediate 24 Δ d5!? also deserved consideration.


24...**∲h8 25 ∰c**7?!

The exchange of queens reduces White's domination, which would have been especially perceptible after 25 心d5! 罩ac8 26 h3 罩fe8 27 罩fe1, when Black runs out of useful moves: 27...f5 28 兔c2 兔d7 29 心f4 etc.

25...⊮̈́xc7

Little was changed by 25...單fe8 26 公d5, but 25...豐e8!? 26 全f2! would have led to a more tense battle.

26 皇xc7 罩f7 27 皇b6 (27 皇d6!?) 27...罩e8 28 h3



28...**ℤd**7?!

Disheartened by the unsuccessful opening, Beliavsky had ended up in time-trouble and lost almost without a fight. Whether good or bad, 28...f5! was essential.

29 ②d5 (threatening **②**c7) **29...ጃc8**


The imprudent 29...全f?? would have lost to 30 全f5! 全e6 31 公c7, but the clumsy regrouping 29...全g8!? 30全f5罩f7 was a try. 30 g4 公g6?! (an unexpected blunder of a pawn; 30...公e7 was more resilient) 31 学h2

Continuing to intensify the pressure, although 31 \(\exists xg6!\)? hxg6 32 \(\exists f4\) suggested itself.

31...②ce5 (31...**②**ge5!?) **32 a4 罩d6 33 a5**

Ø)d7?

A final time-trouble error, although after 33... 표 34 표 fe1 White has an imposing advantage (34... 호xd5 35 cxd5!).



34 🖾 c7! 1-0

Then, in a complicated and error-strewn game I won with Black against Ehlvest, and three rounds before the finish I finally caught up with my rivals, having scored, like Beliavsky and Ivanchuk, 7 out of 10.

The 11th round proved to be the turning-point in the tournament race. Beliavsky again ended up in desperate time-trouble and lost after blundering against Salov. All evening Ivanchuk put Gurevich's position under pressure, and he adjourned the game with an extra pawn and good winning chances. And I, in my first duel with the future world champion Vishy Anand, was ready to employ some lethal opening preparation.

Game 76
G.Kasparov-V.Anand
Linares, 11th Round, 11.03.1991
Petroff Defence C43

1 e4 e5 2 🖾 f3 🖾 f6 3 d4


Usually I played 3 2xe5 (Game Nos.50, 100 in *Garry Kasparov on Garry Kasparov Part I*), but I prepared this line with Timoshchenko before the Leningrad half of the third match (1986), although I employed it only in the 10th game of the fifth match (1990).

3....⁽²⁾ xe4

The most topical line. Karpov replied 3...exd4 4 e5 ②e4 5 ③xd4 d5 6 exd6 ②xd6 7 ②c3 (7 ②d3!?) 7...②c6 8 ③f4 ②f5!? 9 ②b5 ③d6 10 ③e4+ ③e7, but White could have retained some initiative by 11 ②d2!? and 12 0-0-0 (cf. Game No.17 in Kasparov vs. Karpov 1988-2009).

4 **&**d3 d5 5 **⊘**xe5 **&**d6

This sharp plan, developed by Makarychev, Dvoretsky and his pupil Yusupov, was for a long time the main line, but from the spring of 1992 it almost disappeared from serious practice, giving way to the plans with 5... 47 (Game No.95).



Black has won the exchange, but his knight is in danger, and he hopes to maintain the balance by returning his extra material at the right time.

15 &f4!


The weaker 15 🖒 c3 allows Black to equal-

ise by 15.... 自 3 16 當e1 f5 17 exf6 當ae8! intending ... 當xe4 and ... 心c2 (Tal-Karpov, Milan 1975), or immediately 15... f5 (Makarychev-Karpov, Oslo 1984).

15...f5

White is better after 15...f6 16 公c3 fxe5 17 皇e3 (17 皇g3!?) 17...皇f3 18 墨xa1 皇xe4 19 公xe4 (Kasparov-Timman, Paris (rapid) 1991).

Not 19 f3 皇h5 20 ②a3 罩d4 21 皇e3 罩b4 with a quick draw (Sax-Yusupov, Thessaloniki Olympiad 1988).



I studied the well-known variation 19...h6 20 h4 \$\mathbb{Z}\$d3 (Rozentalis-Gelfand, Vilnius 1988) before the 1990 match, and my assistant Sergey Dolmatov (also a pupil of Dvoretsky) found the good set-up with 21 \$\mathbb{L}\$f1! followed by the sacrifice of the e5-pawn in order to occupy this square with the knight. The strength of this idea was demonstrated a year later in Timman-Yusupov (6th match game, Linares 1992): after 21...\$\mathbb{L}\$d4 22 \$\mathbb{L}\$e3 \$\mathbb{L}\$d5 23 \$\mathbb{L}\$xa1! (Yusupov and Dvoretsky had only looked at 23 f4, 23 f3 or 23 e6) 23...\$\mathbb{L}\$xe5 24 \$\mathbb{L}\$C4 White gained an enduring advantage and scored an important win.


I wanted to catch Anand with this novelty, but an unpleasant surprise awaited me.

19...罩xd2!?

Vishy chose a line mentioned by Rozentalis in his *Informator* notes to his game with Gelfand. Strangely enough, in our analysis we had not even considered this possibility.

20 **≜xd2 ≅d8** 21 **≜c3!**

21...\(\bar{\pi}\)d1+ 22 \(\bar{\pi}\)xd1 \(\dag{\pi}\)xd1



23 f4?

Alas, at the board I failed to find the correct 23 \(\hat{\omega}f1!\) (the end of Rozentalis's variation with the evaluation 'clear advantage to White'), which was later studied in detail in correspondence tournaments. After 23...\(\hat{\omega}g8\) 24 \(\hat{\omega}c4+\hat{\omega}f8\) 25 b4 \(\hat{\omega}c2\) 26 \(\hat{\omega}b3!\) Black would have faced a very difficult defence.

23...②c2 24 \$f2 \$g8 25 a4 a5! 26 \$\textit{2xa5}\$\tilde{\Q}\d4 27 \$\tilde{\Lap}f1 \$\tilde{\Lap}b3 \tilde{\V}_2-\forall_2\$

The competitive significance of this game was enormous: by not winning it, I also failed to win the tournament. In the 12th round Ivanchuk quickly beat Gelfand (Boris blundered a piece and resigned as early as the 18th move), Beliavsky defeated Kamsky, and, after being on the verge of defeat, I beat

Ljubojevic. Then the adjournments took place, and just before the finish the leading trio looked like this: Ivanchuk – 9 out of 12; Kasparov – 8½; Beliavsky – 8.

In the last round Beliavsky lost to Karpov, I could do nothing against Yusupov and I saved the game only by a miracle in a time scramble, while Ivanchuk drew with Timman and retained sole first place. This was his finest hour! After such a triumph the 22-year-old Lvov player was now firmly recognised in the chess world as the main challenger for the crown.

For the first time in the nearly ten years that had passed since Tilburg 1981, I failed to take or at least share 1st place. It was not only a matter of the crisis that was natural after a world championship match, and not only due to my lack of a constant trainer or the growing pressure of the young wave (Ivanchuk and Gelfand had been joined by Anand). The slump in my play was also caused by my enormously chaotic Moscow existence, the lack of order in my life and my involvement in politics.

At that time I outlined my beliefs in an article 'Is it not too much for the champion...', published in the newspaper *Moscow News* (1991 No.2):

'I should like at last to explain myself. To those for whom my ideas away from the chess board seem like the extremism of a young man. To those who, shrugging their shoulders, ask in perplexity: why does he get involved in politics? In chess he is the leader, the world champion, and, as the satirist said ironically — a respected person. Perfectly successful and even independent in comparison with most of his contemporaries. And if he were to stick to playing, he would add to the achievements of Soviet sport. But instead of this — participation in democratic rallies, risky political forecasts in the press, and even

the refusal to play under the USSR flag in the last match with Karpov... Is it not too much for a chess player, even if he is the champion?

'I think that the main role in my current views has been played by several factors. The first is the situation in which I have found myself. After all, the motto "Chess is above politics", widely propagated in our country for decades, was in fact a screen, behind which the essence was concealed. The idea of the country's ideologues was that, with their victories abroad and their titles, sports people should "once again" demonstrate the superiority of the socialist system, and its successes in promoting the complete development of a person. Chess players, in particular, were earmarked for demonstrating on the international arena the successes of our society as regards intellect.

'This political reality arose back in those distant years when Mikhail Botvinnik distinguished himself in chess. And when in the 1970s the Karpov-Korchnoi confrontation arose, the situation was politicised in the extreme. The matches for the title of world champion were played not by two outstanding grandmasters, but by a representative of the foremost ranks of Soviet youth, enjoying comprehensive state support, against a renegade and traitor, who had dared to express his dissatisfaction with the existing order in the country.

'Willy-nilly it turned out that, in entering the battle for the supreme title, a chess player became involved in high-level politics. He had to "conform" to the views of the ruling structure, and to be a "person of the system". Otherwise the system would not compromise its principles. And they, alas, were by no means to do with sport. And so it turns out that in our country the world chess champion is not a title, but a duty, and one that is rather politicised.

'It is said that for a serious politician I spend too much time on chess, and for a chess player – an unjustified amount on politics. But after all, an ability to assess your actions critically, analyse a situation and anticipate your opponent's moves is necessary in any matter. If, of course, you want to achieve something in it. In chess I have achieved. And it is largely thanks to this that politicians are already listening to my opinion about the developing situation in our country. It is a pity that for the moment this is only in the West.

'Chess is a black and white game, without compromises. At least, for anyone who wants to come first. In making this choice I was helped by my character and upbringing. And the battle for and around the title of world champion helped to determine my attitudes. I began with democratic changes in the chess world, I was the first to speak out for the democratisation of Soviet sport, and now I am doing what I can to further this process in society. The title of champion is not only for the satisfaction of personal ambition. It is to advance and proceed further. Everything is rapidly changing. In 1985 I criticised the directors of chess, and today I am publicly disagreeing with the president of the country...'

Incidentally, my autobiography *Unlimited Challenge*, published in 1989, concluded with these words: 'I regard 1987 as a turning-point in my life. The publication of my book *Child of Change* and the ensuing rift with the Soviet Sports Committee can really be said to have determined my relations with the system. Today I am free of illusion; in the words of Robert Jordan in Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls*: "There were fifty years of undeclared war against fascism ahead, and I had signed on for the duration".'

One-off Inspiration

Euwe Memorial Tournament (Amsterdam, 2–13 May 1991): 1–2. Salov and Short – 6 out of 9; 3–4. Karpov and **Kasparov** – $5\frac{1}{2}$; 5. Korchnoi – $4\frac{1}{2}$; 6–7. Hjartarson and Timman – 4; 8. M.Gurevich – $3\frac{1}{2}$; 9–10. van der Wiel and Ljubojevic – 3.

Two months after Linares, Karpov and I met at the Euwe Memorial – a tournament of ten grandmasters in Amsterdam. Due to my participation in the turbulent social and political life of the country (I should remind you: this was the last year of the USSR's existence), I was unable to run into good form and on this occasion I performed terribly. Moreover, although on the whole Amsterdam was somewhat weaker than Linares, I found points even harder to come by.

Playing the Sicilian Najdorf against van der Wiel in round 1, after 6 \$\otinge\$g5 e6 7 f4 I chose 7...\$\overline{\text{w}}c7\$ (instead of the critical 7...\$\overline{\text{w}}b6) 8 \$\overline{\text{w}}f3\$ \$\overline{\text{D}}bd7\$ (instead of 8...b5) which allowed a forced drawing variation, and in an attempt to devise something I almost lost. In a better position in the 2nd round I was unable to finish off Gurevich. In the 3rd round I had a very complicated game with Short - I gained an advantage, but lost it as time-trouble approached. Something similar occurred in the next game with Salov. Then I had excellent King's Indian play against Hjartarson, but Black's initiative, alas, was insufficient for a win.

In the 6th round I played Karpov, who by that time had managed to win one game and together with Salov and Korchnoi was half a point behind the leader, Short. A win over me by the ex-champion could have become the springboard for overall victory in the tournament, but I turned up for the game in a fighting mood, hoping finally to make full use of the white pieces (incidentally, in Horgen

1995, immediately after the match with Anand, I also began with five draws, and then lost in nightmarish style with White against Ivanchuk, who in the end became one of the tournament winners). Karpov as though sensed that there was a large-scale battle in prospect, and he again chose the very sharp line in the already complicated Zaitsev Variation of the Ruy Lopez, in which he had suffered a severe defeat in the 20th game of our recent match. He had prepared an improvement (cf. Game No.74, note to Black's 19th move) and then, exploiting my uncertain play, he seized the initiative and was very close to a win, but in desperate time-trouble he allowed me to save the game.

By the 7th round, in which I had to do battle with the uncompromising Viktor Korchnoi, for the first time I was seriously in contention for the title of 'drawing king'. I had never played worse, and there were only three more rounds before the finish. Korchnoi was in the mood for a grand battle, clearly realising that a better chance of beating me might not present itself. I was also not intending to back out – it was time I won! The choice of opening variation in our duel was pre-determined.

Game 77

V.Korchnoi-G.Kasparov

Amsterdam, 7th Round,

10.05.1991

King's Indian Defence E99

1 ②f3 ②f6 2 c4 g6 3 ②c3 ②g7 4 e4 d6 5 d4 0-0 6 ②e2 e5 7 0-0 ②c6 8 d5 ②e7 9 ②e1

The fanciful 9 a4 allows Black a comfortable game: 9...a5! 10 \bigcirc e1 \bigcirc d7 11 \bigcirc e3 f5 12 f3 \bigcirc c5 13 \bigcirc d3 b6 14 b4 \bigcirc xd3 15 \bigcirc xd3 axb4 16 \bigcirc b5 \bigcirc b8! 17 \bigcirc b3 \bigcirc g8 (Korchnoi-Kasparov, Barcelona 1989).


9...€\d7

A year later as an experiment I employed against Shirov (Manila Olympiad 1992) and Korchnoi (Debrecen 1992) the risky variation 9... De8 10 &e3 f5 11 f3 f4 12 &f2 h5 13 c5 g5 (cf. Game No. 40 in My Great Predecessors Part V).

10 **≜**e3

Korchnoi's favourite set-up, which earlier was considered rather slow and less good than 10 2d f5 11 2d (*Game No.64*), but which has now become very topical.

10...f5 11 f3 f4 12 \$ f2 g5



13 a4!?

Piket played 13 b4 against me (*Game No.58*). Korchnoi also tried 13 🗈 b5 (Game No.39 in *My Great Predecessors Part V*), but from 1996 he switched to 13 \(\beta\)c1? with the idea of 13...\(\beta\)g6 14 c5! \(\beta\)xc5 15 b4 \(\beta\)a6 16 \(\beta\)d3 h5 17 \(\beta\)b5 \(\beta\)d7 18 a4 \(\beta\)h6 19 \(\beta\)c3 (Piket-Kasparov, Linares 1997; Korchnoi-Cvitan, Pula 1997).

13...**∮**]g6

If 13...h5, then 14 a5! (Korchnoi-Forster, Switzerland 1994; Korchnoi-Xie Jun, Prague 1995). But consideration should be given to 13...a5!? 14 2d3 b6 15 b4 axb4 16 2xb4 2f6 17 2a3 2d7 with double-edged play (Yusupov-Kasparov, Yerevan Olympiad 1996).

14 ②d3 (14 a5! is more energetic – in the 1990s Korchnoi won half a dozen games with this move) **14...②f6**

There is no sense in keeping the knight on d7 any longer: the c4-c5 break is inevitable.

15 c5 h5


With the obvious threat of ...g5-g4. The alternative is 15... \$\frac{1}{2}f7\$ or 15... \$\frac{1}{2}h8\$ 16 a5 \$\frac{1}{2}g8\$ (as played by Landa against Korchnoi), for the moment managing without ... \$h7-h5\$ and leaving the \$h5-square\$ for the knight.

16 h3

A questionable novelty – a weakening in the place where White is being attacked: now the opening of lines on the kingside will be even more dangerous for him. 16 cxd6?! is also inaccurate: 16...cxd6 17 a5 g4 18 55 g3! with a counterattack (Larsen-Torre, Bauang 1973). However, 16 a5! g4 17 c6 (Korchnoi-Xie Jun, Amsterdam 2001) or 17 a6 bxa6 18 5b4 is sounder.

16...≌f7 17 c6

This was the idea of my highly-experienced opponent, but it all turned out rather differently than he had planned...



17...g4? is incorrect in view of 18 fxg4 hxg4 19 cxb7 &xb7 20 &xg4. After 17...&f8 there is the unpleasant 18 &b4! (my *Informator* suggestion 18 &b5 is weaker because of 18...bxc6) 18...b6 (otherwise cxb7 and

②c6) 19 a5! etc. And after 17...bxc6 18 dxc6 ②e6 19 ②b4 White seizes the d5-point and the initiative: 19...g4 20 hxg4 hxg4 21 fxg4 ③b8 22 ②bd5! ③xb2 23 ②xa7 營a8 24 ②f2 ③xc6 25 ②f3 and a4-a5.

17...a5!


I was terribly proud of this unexpected move, impeding White's offensive. Black also plays on the opponent's territory (as though to counter-balance 16 h3), hoping later to make progress on the kingside while White is creating a passed pawn on the a-file.

18 cxb7

The immediate 18 b4 allows 18...b6 19 bxa5 bxa5!, when White's activity comes to a standstill, whereas Black calmly prepares an attack by皇h6, ...還q7 and ...q5-q4.

18...**\$xb7** 19 b4

The attempt to play against the c7-pawn – 19 Ξ c1 &c8 20 0b5 g4 21 wc2 runs into 21...g3! 22 &e1 &xh3! 23 gxh3 wc8, when White is forced to return the piece – 24 0f2 (24 &d1?! 0h4!) 24...0e8 (not rushing with 24...gxf2+? 25 Ξ xf2!) and then ...0h4 with a comfortable game for Black.



19... 20 bxa5 19...


With the intention of breaking out afterg5-g4 and\$g5-h4. Here the routine 20....\$f8?! has no point: the d6-pawn does not need defending.

21 6 b4

After the game Korchnoi claimed he could have gained an advantage by 21 a6. After 21... £xa6 22 2b4 White's position, thanks to his passed a-pawn, is indeed better.

But after 21...g4! 22 fxg4 hxg4 23 hxg4 \$\oting{9}g5\$ he is forced to find almost the only moves to defend: for example, 24 a7 \$\overline{9}g1\$? \$\overline{2}g1\$ \$\overline{1}g1\$ \$\overline{9}g1\$ \$\overline{1}g1\$ \$\overline{2}g1\$ \$\overline{1}g1\$ \$\overline{2}g1\$ \$\overline{1}g1\$ \$\overline{2}g1\$ \$\overline{1}g1\$ \$\overline{2}g1\$ \$\overline{1}g1\$ \$\overline{2}g1\$ \$\overline{1}g1\$ \$\overline{2}g1\$ \$\overline{2}g2\$ \$\overline{2}g


21...g4 22 🖾 c6 f8



23 fxg4?

Equivalent to capitulation: in White's defences there are now yawning gaps, through which the black pieces now inexorably infiltrate his position.

Korchnoi was probably unnerved by the threatened capture on h3, which it would appear can be parried by 23 a6! (to decide on such a move on the threshold of time-



25 &f3

A vain attempt to plug the hole. However, even the slightly more resilient 25 罩a3 did not help in view of 25...豐h6 26 ②b5 f3! 27 ②xf3 罩h7 28 ②g3 ②e3+ 29 罩xe3 豐xe3+ 30 罩f2 (30 ②f2 豐f4!) 30...豐h6! 31 罩f1 ②xg4 32 ②xq4 ②xe4 33 ②h3 ②xq3 and wins.

25...⊮h6 26 ≌e1 ∅h4!


The right way! The stereotyped 26...\$h4? would have sharply reduced Black's attacking potential: 27 \$\displant\text{sf1} \displant\text{sxf2}?! 28 \$\displant\text{sxf2}\$\displant\text{xq4} + 29 \$\displant\text{e2}\$, and White is still afloat.

27 **&**xh4

Alas, White is forced to give up bishop for knight: things are altogether catastrophic after 27 \$\&\text{\$\frac{1}{2}\$} \alpha \text{\$\frac{1}{2}\$} \alpha \text{\$\frac{1}

27...\delta xh4!

In this game the King's Indian bishop has made a brilliant career for itself! 27...豐xh4? was incorrect: 28 當f1 ②xg4 29 當e2. Now, however, the white king is unable to break out of the mating net.



28 g5

28... ₩xg5 29 ℤe2 ②g4 (29... 2g3!) 30 ℤb1 2g3 31 ₩d3 (desperation) 31... ₩h4

The threat is $... \triangle e3$ and $... \ base h2$ mate, so White resigned (0-1).

An impressive rout. This spectacular game was voted the best in the 51st volume of *Informator*. At that time this is what happened in my games with Korchnoi: even if I was performing indifferently in a tournament, against him I played with inspiration and usually I won.

Karpov also launched a belated pursuit of the leaders, by winning against Timman. But in the next, penultimate round, I failed to break down the Dutch grandmaster, who played without any serious mistakes. And