Stuart Rachels

The Best I Saw in Chess

Games, Stories and Instruction from an Alabama Prodigy Who Became U.S. Champion

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Preface

The games in this book were played at slow (or 'classical') time controls, with no delays or increments, between two people sitting across from each other.

This is a book about chess, illustrated with material from my games. The book addresses so many topics in strategy and competitive play that it could be called a 'complete chess course', if that phrase isn't taken too expansively.

A benefit of studying my games is that you've never seen them before. Which is good. Less good is that you may not know me. So let me tell you about myself, to begin our friendship while providing some context for all the chess to come.

I grew up in Birmingham, Alabama, and played 1,011 rated games from the ages of 9 to 23, or from 1979 to 1993. My rating began at 1496 (USCF) and rose steadily until it passed 2600 (USCF), when I was 20. I never played professionally, and I retired upon entering graduate school. I wrote this book in my 40s in Alabama.

The exhilaration of competition and the joy of mental absorption — that's why I played chess. I loved it. I still love it. My brother David taught me the moves around my 8th birthday, and before I turned 12 (or more precisely: at 11 years, 10 months and 13 days) I became the Youngest Master in American history, when my rating reached exactly 2200 before plummeting down into the 2120s. So I made master about four years after learning the rules — or let's say five, because I wasn't master strength until I was 12¾, when Dave Gertler and I shared top honors in the 1982 U.S. Junior Open. Up to then, I don't think any American had made master so quickly. In an earlier era, it took Bobby Fischer seven whole years (can you believe that?!).¹ At 12 years and 9 months, I was the youngest U.S. Junior Open Champion in history, because Fischer had been a decrepit 13 years and 4 months. (I won \$225; Fischer won a portable typewriter.)²

¹ Fischer became a master at 13 and learned the rules at 5 or 6. Why '5 or 6'? As an adult, Fischer said in an interview that he learned at 6: see the documentary Bobby Fischer Against the World (2011), at 10:38. Yet when he was just 15, Fischer wrote of learning the moves 'early in 1949' – which suggests 5, since Fischer was born on March 9, 1943: see Bobby Fischer, Bobby Fischer's Games of Chess (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), p. xi.

² Bobby Fischer, Bobby Fischer's Games of Chess (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), p. xiii.

The curse of my career story is consistency. I represented the U.S. in both the 1984 and 1985 World Under-16 Championships. Both years, I finished 7-4 and tied for 5th. Not bad, I guess. But instead of averaging 5th, I would rather have averaged 15th — with one 29th-place finish and one world title! Streaky players can trumpet their triumphs, but steady players can only boast boringly about their ratings.

Two players were vital for my development: Kyle Therrell (then called 'Dana'), my best friend and local rival; and my trainer from the age of 12, IM Boris Kogan. From Kyle, I learned all of my openings, one pairing at a time. Here was our drill: When the pairings were posted before a round, we'd hurry over to a quiet spot. 'What does so-and-so play?' I'd ask. My next question was, 'What do I do against that?' And finally I'd ask: 'How is that supposed to be for White/Black?' Without Kyle, I would have been lost — especially because Boris Kogan had no interest in opening theory. From Boris, I learned the finer points of position evaluation. Kogan played like Petrosian. 'You must play seemple chess,' he always told me. 'Kviet moves.' Thanks to Boris, I eventually became a weak strong player. Without him, I would only have become a dangerous patzer.

When I went to college in Atlanta, Georgia, at age 17, I had just become the highest-rated American player under the age of 21. At that hiccup in history, Max Dlugy was too old (21), Gata Kamsky (13) and Ilya Gurevich (15) were too young, and I outrated Patrick Wolff (19), who usually outrated me. Yet I felt like half a failure: I hadn't gotten any stronger in the last year; Wolff, I knew, was actually better than me (and maybe Alex Fishbein was, too); I had never won a prestigious event; not only was I untitled, but I had no norms; and, most importantly to me, I knew I had failed to transition from 'top junior' to 'top American player'. A rating of 2545 (USCF) put me in the country's top 50, but only barely. All talent and no results seemed to sum it up.

Happily, though, I had an unexpected 'second life'. Despite my immersion in college, the next summer I won the U.S. Junior Championship, on my 6th try. This earned me a spot in the 1989 U.S. Championship – a 16-player, invitational round robin. 'You're lucky it's a zonal year!' my brother joked. When I went undefeated in that event, tying for first, I did indeed qualify for the 1990 Interzonal (the next step towards the World Championship). But also, in one swoop, I became an IM, earned the equivalent of two GM norms (with half-a-point to spare), pushed my USCF rating over 2600, became a top-20 American player, won \$5,000, and was given the full cover of Chess Life (in February, 1990). At 20

years and 2½ months, I was the youngest U.S. Champion since Fischer.³ This one event spurred a sea change in my self-image.

I never became a GM, and I played so little internationally that my FIDE rating always lagged behind my strength (my final Elo was 2485; my final USCF was 2605). The rating system used by Jeff Sonas on chessmetrics.com weights recent games especially heavily and thus favors my profile. According to it, I peaked at #152 in the world in April of 1990, with a rating of 2604, and was among the top 100 players in history aged 20 years and 7 months (for players up to December 2004)⁴, making me 8th at that age among Americans, behind Kamsky, Fischer, Seirawan, Evans, Denker, Dlugy, and Lombardy. In 1990, I was arguably the second-best amateur in the world, after GM Simen Agdestein of Norway.

I'm most proud of this: in the four most prestigious events I played in – three invitational U.S. Championships and the 1990 Interzonal – my combined score was positive: 11 wins, 10 losses, and 26 draws, or 24-23. So, when I played the big boys, I held my own. And that, I suppose, means I was one of them.

P.S. This book can't be too bad, I think, given that a game which didn't make the cut included this position:



Maybe I'll put this game in a future book, titled 'Poorly Played Games with Cool Positions'.

P.P.S. Shouldn't chess sets be sold with an extra black pawn? I'm always losing those things.

³ Larry Evans was 19 in 1951, and Fischer was 14 in 1957. Later, Kamsky would be champion at 17, and Nakamura at 16.

⁴ More precisely, chessmetrics.com puts me in 98th-100th place (http://www.chessmetrics.com/cm/CM2/SingleAge. asp?Params=199510SSSSS3S105517000000121000000000025610247), accessed August, 2019.

(French for 'Black'), I wrote 'Vassili Yvantchouk'. Our game began:

Game 5 Modern, Classical Stuart Rachels Vasily Ivanchuk

2390

Paris Wch U16 1984 (5)

1.e4 d6 2.d4 g6 3.\(\varthi\)c3 \(\hat{\omega}\)g7 4.\(\varthi\)f3 \(\hat{\omega}\)g4 5.\(\hat{\omega}\)e3 \(\varthi\)c6



So far, this is Smyslov-Timman, Wijk aan Zee, 1972. In those days, Timman says, he 'spent too little time on serious opening research,' which is why some of his openings were 'quite dubious'.²⁰

6. **皇b**5

'That's the problem,' Timman laments. 'White will get a superior structure almost by force, and he obtains the upper hand in the centre as well.'²¹

6...a6 7. ②xc6+ bxc6 8.h3 ②d7
Passive. Timman tried 8... ③xf3
9. ∰xf3 e6 but had a clear
disadvantage after 10.e5 ②e7 11. ②e4
公d5 12. ②g5 ∰b8 13.0-0. Black is

weak on f6, and his knight will be evicted from d5 with c2-c4.

9.0-0 e6 10.e5 f5 11. 总f4 營b8



Black's sorry opening only buttressed my optimism. He's behind in development, his dark squares are weak, and his bishops are boxed in. After 12. Ee1! 6h6 13. 6a4! 6f7 14.c4 b7 15.exd6 cxd6 16.c5!, White is already winning (Stockfish). But I wanted to protect my b-pawn.

12.5 a4

A decent sally, if the idea is to play c2-c4 and to refute 12...c5 tactically. However, I was already intending the rancid moves to come.

12...c5 13.c3?

A pity that I did not play 13.exd6!! (Stockfish) 13...\(\hat{\omega}\)xa4 (13...\(\cdot\)xc5 wins) 14.\(\bar{\omega}\)er! \(\hat{\omega}\)d7 15.dxc7!. Now let's consider two moves:

A) 15...豐b6 16.dxc5 豐xc5 17.盒d6 and instead of the engine's 17...豐c6 18.②e5!, I prefer my line: 17...豐b5 18.②d4 豐c4 (18...豐d5 allows the annihilating 19.②xe6!

²⁰ Jan Timman, Timman's Titans: My World Chess Champions (Alkmaar, The Netherlands: New In Chess, 2016), p. 88.

²¹ Jan Timman, Timman's Titans: My World Chess Champions (Alkmaar, The Netherlands: New In Chess, 2016), p. 89.

≝xd1 20. □xg7+ ġf7 21. □axd1
ġxg7 22. ℚe5+) 19. □xf5! gxf5
20. ⋓h5 mate!!. Had those moves
been played, might my picture be
displayed today at the World Chess
Hall of Fame in St. Louis, Missouri?;

B) 15... 對 16.dxc5! gives White tripled pawns and an overwhelming initiative for the sacrificed piece. A logical sequel is 16... ② 16 17. ② e5 (preventing castling) 17... 對 c6 18. 對 d6! 對 xd6 19.cxd6 (a funny pawn structure!) 19... ② c6 20. ② d4 ۞ d7 21. ② b3! ② h5 22. ② c5+ ⑤ c8 23. ② ad1 with a winning position (Stockfish).

I didn't consider 13.exd6!! seriously because I couldn't calculate it out to the end. However, if your sacrifices are always sound, then you don't make enough of them. Trust your judgment. Take a few risks. Just don't abuse the privilege.

13...cxd4 14.cxd4 ②e7 15.exd6? cxd6 16.②c5? ②d5 17.≗h2 f4 18.⊙xd7 ≌xd7



A revolting series of moves. It's as though I thought the object of chess were not to checkmate the enemy king but merely to prevent it from castling. With these moves, I've let Black undouble his c-pawns, I've swapped off Black's worst piece (his light-squared bishop), and I've let him catch up in development. Moreover, I've done all this to force Black's king to d7, where it is safe and will be well placed for the endgame. From this point on, Yvantchouk played like Ivanchuk and ground me into dust: 0-1 (46).

That night, I walked into the dining hall feeling utterly dejected. When I passed the Soviets' table, the Soviet coach, GM Alexey Suetin, reached out and roughed up my blond hair with a sympathetic smile. This gesture cheered me up for half a second. That night, my trainer, Boris Kogan, gave me a tongue-lashing like I'd never received as a player (and he didn't even know about 13.exd6!!). When we played over the game and Boris saw my 'revolting series of moves', he stood up – he was too agitated to stay seated. He began pacing. 'You played these moves? This shows you have no understanding of chess! No understanding at all! I am a bad teacher!' He went on like this for a while. I was angry at him for berating me – didn't I feel bad enough already? But I was 14, so I took my lumps.

Looking back, I understand these events from Boris's point of view. Two and a half years earlier, he had emigrated from the U.S.S.R. He had no ambitions as a player, but he loved to teach. And he had

found a good student, despite living in the chess-starved South. And now, here we were, playing for the World Championship; here was Boris's chance to show his former compatriots that he was still in the game, that his pupil was as good as theirs. And what happened? I lost to the Soviets in consecutive rounds, and I played so badly in the second game that it made Boris look bad. Of course he was upset.

Two Postscripts

A week later, Ivanchuk and I played basketball for two or three hours, as both teammates and opponents. 'Chuky' was so uncoordinated that I was constantly having to dodge his elbows and his skull. Oddly enough, that afternoon endeared him to me: he couldn't play worth a lick, but he was out there anyway, trying his best.

One more memory: at the 1988 World Junior Championship, Ivanchuk was in terrible time trouble in round 4 against Lars Bo Hansen of Denmark. I could see their game from my table. For over half an hour, Ivanchuk was shifting around excitedly in his chair, grunting, slamming pieces, and banging the clock. At one point, he even knocked the clock off the table. I found his behavior distracting, and I wasn't even playing him.

At the same time, Ivanchuk was playing splendidly. When they reached the time control, Hansen's position was hopeless. Ivanchuk got up and left the room. When he returned, he offered a draw. I assumed that the Soviet coach, Anatoly Bykhovsky, had told him to. The next day, I asked his opponent whether he had been upset with Ivanchuk during their game. 'No,' Lars replied thoughtfully. 'I wasn't angry. I just thought he couldn't help it.'

The Controlled Blitz

In general, when your opponent is in time trouble, you should ignore it. Stay calm; keep trying to find the best moves; move at your normal pace. Yet you needn't always ignore your opponent's time shortage. You may also employ any of three strategies. Each can work, if implemented judiciously. First, you can complicate the position or set a specific trap; your opponent might falter for lack of time. This is especially smart if you're losing and thus have nothing to lose. This ploy works best when your initial move is unexpected. Second, you can slow down your rate of play. That's right, don't speed up; slow down. I describe the benefits of this strategy in my game with Fedorowicz in 'Two Rogue Sozins'.

Third, if you can prepare not only your next move but also your follow-up to a logical reply, then you can perform a 'controlled blitz'. You do this by moving, recording your move, and then responding


instantly to your opponent's reply. In this way, you can put pressure on your opponent without unduly trusting your powers of foresight. Naturally, the effectiveness of these strategies will depend on the size of the increment. If a player can never have less than two minutes, then his time pressure can never be too severe.

Here's an example of the controlled blitz in action.

Game 6
Stuart Rachels
Margeir Petursson

2550

Manila izt 1990 (2)



Position after 36... \Bigsip 57-b2

White is up the exchange with an outside passed pawn. The win is a matter of technique, as they say. However, I wasn't sure I had any. At any rate, I didn't care to find out. I preferred to exploit my opponent's time trouble, if I could. Petursson had only a minute or so to make his next four moves.

I began to think. The most obvious continuation seemed to be 37. \(\bar{\textsf{Z}} \)d8+

\$\delta g7 38.\$\delta d7\$ with the nasty threat of 39. ⊑f3. Black doesn't want to swap rooks with 38... \begin{aligned} \text{ and 39... \begin{aligned} \text{ af6} \end{aligned} \end{aligned} because, once Black's rook is gone, White can activate his king hasslefree, and then the win is trivial. (In general, when queens are gone, a player who has only one rook should be especially loath to lose it – unless he is trading it for his opponent's only remaining rook.) So Black's toughest defense after 38. \(\bar{\pmathbf{d}} \) d 38. \(\bar{\pmathbf{d}} \) d 39. \(\bar{\pmathbf{f}} \) f 3 d4. Now I wanted to win Black's d-pawn with 40. If4, but after 40... \squad d3+ my rook must return to f3 to defend my a-pawn. Hmmmm. As I mulled this over, I realized that Petursson was probably thinking the same thoughts. However, unlike me, he had to be ready to make these moves quickly, starting with …⊈g7 and …≣d2. This gave me an idea. What if I go 37.\(\bar{2}\)d8+ \(\dec{x} \)g7 and then play 38. \(\begin{aligned} \text{Zc3 rapidly? Petursson} \end{aligned} \) will be poised to play 38...\(\begin{aligned} \text{dd} 2, \text{but} \end{aligned} that move would lose to 39.\(\begin{aligned} \pm xc4! \end{aligned} \(\begin{aligned} \Begin{aligned} \Begin{alig 42. №e3. Of course, a GM will see such a tactic, but even so, if he's taken by surprise then he might become flustered by the clock and err in some way.

I looked at the position afresh and decided that trying this little ploy couldn't hurt me; the rook move is safe and doesn't really change the position. So I played

37.⊈d8+ and after **37...∲g7**

I quickly scribbled 'ad8+' on my scoresheet and played

38.\(\mathbb{Z}\)c3!

It worked. Petursson's hand instinctively went for his rook, but then he withdrew it, as if he'd just noticed that I hadn't played 38. \$\mathbb{Z}\$d7. Margeir seemed rattled. Again, he reached out to play something but then pulled back his hand. Finally, he bashed out

38...**ℤ**a2?

And then I played

39. □d7

With my rook on c3, Black has no defense to the threat of 40.\(\begin{align*} \begin{align*} \alpha \end{align*} & \text{...} \\ \alpha \

If you wish to blitz out a longer sequence, do so at your own peril. In the penultimate round of the 1989 U.S. Championship, GM Boris Gulko, playing White, offered me a draw in mutual time pressure, which I gladly accepted. Then I went into the analysis room, which was abuzz. IM Jack Peters was leading the discussion of my game. 'What do you think of the final position?' several people asked me. I walked up to the demo board and began trotting out my intention. After several moves, I played ... \$\delta\$h8!?, the justification of my risky-looking idea. The room erupted with protests! This was because the move was illegal (White had a bishop on f6), and my whole variation was nonsense. Yet, as I

told the crowd, not only had I been planning to play those moves, but I was planning to play them instantly in order to confound my opponent! If you use the 'controlled blitz', then you must abide by the rule that governs the event. In my day, the rule was: you cannot make your second move until you have written down your own first move. More generally, you cannot skip more than two 'half-moves' on your scoresheet (skipping one full move is allowed), unless you are short of time.

Amazingly, Boris Gelfand future Challenger to the World Championship - didn't know this rule when we played in the 1988 World Junior Championship. Gelfand, as White, performed the controlled blitz: he moved; I replied; and he moved again, but without touching his scoresheet. I then did something unusually physical in the middle of a serious chess game. In a quarter-second, I decided against summoning the arbiter about Gelfand's transgression – after all, my flag would fall as I explained the situation; we'd have to deal with the language barrier (Boris spoke Russian; I spoke English); it would disturb the players around us; it would disrupt the flow of our game; and Gelfand and I would each be tempted to think about the position 'off the clock' while the dispute was being settled. In short, the whole thing promised to be a major hassle. Also, in the end, White would not

be penalized in any serious way. So, when Gelfand hit the clock, I immediately slapped it back (bang bang!) one-minute style, without making a move. Gelfand peered up at me quizzically – he must've been startled, but he just seemed puzzled. Not knowing how to say 'update your scoresheet' in Russian, I simply pointed at Gelfand's scoresheet. What he did now made a big impression on me. Without hesitating, he looked down at his scoresheet, filled in half a move, and quickly re-hit the clock, making it my move again. Both the speed of his adjustment and the fact that he wrote down only half a move (and not the full 1½ moves missing, nor even one full move) speaks to his competitive prowess.²² This incident lasted about five seconds.

Very Strong Piece

The 1990 Interzonal was a tough tournament. How often can you get a minus score (I ended on '-1') yet finish ahead of Kamsky, Portisch, Smyslov, and Vaganian? I played GMs Adams, Chandler, Dzindzichashvili, Petursson, Short, and Spraggett – not to mention the players who beat me in rounds 7, 8, and 9! I hadn't lost three straight since turning 14. After that gooseegg trifecta, my unintended 'Swiss Gambit' got me paired against a 2400 in round 10, IM Assem Afifi of Egypt. I wanted to prepare for

my opponent, but all I knew was that super-GM Robert Hübner had punished Afifi in an earlier round for playing a risky line in the Sicilian. I didn't think he'd try that line again. Wrong!

Game 7
Sicilian Defense, Accelerated Dragon
Stuart Rachels

Assem Afifi

2400

Manila izt 1990 (10)

1.e4 c5 2. ②f3 ②c6 3.d4 cxd4 4. ②xd4 g6 5.c4 ②g7 6. ②e3 d6 7. ②c3 ②h6 8. ③e2 0-0 9.0-0 f5 10.exf5 ③xd4 An odd-looking move, but 11. ②xd4?! ②xf5 is awkward for White.

11. **≜xh6 ≝xf5** 12. **≜f**3



Hübner-Afifi continued 12... \(\hat{\omega}\)g7
13. \(\hat{\omega}\)xg7 \(\hat{\omega}\)xg7 14. \(\hat{\omega}\)e4 \(\bat{\omega}\)f7 15. \(\bat{\omega}\)d2
\(\bat{\omega}\)b6 16. \(\hat{\omega}\)d5 e6 17. \(\hat{\omega}\)xc6 \(\bat{\omega}\)xc6
18. \(\bat{\omega}\)ad1 \(\bat{\omega}\)xc4 19. \(\bat{\omega}\)xd6 1-0 (31).

Against me, Afifi played
12... \(\hat{\omega}\)xc3 13.bxc3 \(\hat{\omega}\)e5 14. \(\hat{\omega}\)e4 \(\bat{\omega}\)h5
15. \(\hat{\omega}\)e3

My bishops, I felt, give White a nice edge, and I wasn't worried when Black sacrificed the exchange.

²² I feel certain that Gelfand wasn't breaking the rules knowingly. He had nothing to gain from causing a commotion, and he is known to be an ethical player.

15...**≜e6? 16.≜**xb7 **≜**xc4 17.**≜**xa8 **₩**xa8

If 17... \(\hat{2}xf1? 18. \(\hat{2}d5 + \text{ wins outright.} \) **18. \(\hat{L}e1 \) \(\hat{2}d5 \)**



Perhaps Afifi expected 19.f3? \(\hat{L}\)xf3! with a fierce attack.

19.f4!

Now on 19... ②c4 20. ∰g4, Black has nothing for the exchange. So he must keep sacrificing.

19... 2xg2 20.fxe5 2h3 21. Ee2 Not 21. **Ed2**? **Eh4!** when White is illplaced to meet 22... **Eg4+**.

21... **營f3**

During the game, I planned to rescue my king with 22.\delta f2, seeing wins. But Black should try 22... £g4, attacking h2 and e2. Now I saw the sneaky corner-move 23. ₩h1 and liked my chances after 23... ₩f8+ 24.�e1 臭xe2 25.�xe2 豐f5 26.豐d5+ **\$g7 27.**□¶\$f1 □xh2+ 28.□¶\$f2. Did you notice the error in that last line? I missed that after 23.\#h1? (23. \$\disperseq e1 is still equal 23), 23... \$\disperseq f3!! is a humdinger. White is in trouble after 24. 學xf3 罩xh2+ 25. 會g3 国h3+ or 24.營g1 国g4 25.營f1 国g2+

(Houdini). This means that 21... ℤh4 22. ⊈f2? is only equal.

The correct continuation after 21... Land is 22. 一为3+! 空 7 23.c4!! (Houdini). At the board, I thought 22. 一为3+ would misplace my queen, but 23.c4!! opens up the third rank, preventing 23... 一有3?? due to 24. 全角6+!. The most logical continuation is 23... 是 24. 全 62 一次2+ 25. 全 61 一个1+ 26. 全 62 一个2+ 25. 全 64 一个2+ 26 个个2+ 26 个个2

22.耳f2! 營xe3 23.營d5+ 含g7 Not 23...e6?? (or 23...含h8??) 24.營a8+ 含g7 25.營f8 mate.

24. 当f7+ 含h6 25. 当f8+ 含g5 26. 当xe7+ 含g4



27. **營xd6**

Winning, but even stronger was 27.exd6!, creating a powerful passed pawn. I chose 27.營xd6 because I had calculated it accurately: I foresaw the game continuation, which goes well for White, as well as the picturesque 27.營xd6 富g5 28.營d4+! 含h5+ 29.含h1,

^{23 23.\$\}dagger e1 &\dagger xe2 24.\$\dagger xe2 \dagger h1+ 25.\$\dagger f1 \dagger e4 26.\$\dagger f2 \dagger h3 27.\$\dagger d2 \dagger d5+ 28.\$\dagger c2 \dagger e4+ 29.\$\dagger d5+, draw - Houdini.

when White forces off the queens, remaining an exchange up. After 27.exd6! \(\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \alpha \\ \ext{E} & \\ \ext{O} \\ \ext{White mustn't get} \end{aligned} \) careless with 28.營xh7?? 營e1+. He 30.罩f2 灃e1+ is a draw. So White should play either 28.營f7 or 28.營f6 in order to fortify his defense of f1. But which one? Either way, Black will play 28... \(\bar{\pi} g5, \threatening 29...⊈h5+, so the question is where White's queen should be in order to help White meet that threat. The answer is 28.\frac{w}{f7!} \frac{\textbf{Z}}{g5} 29.\frac{w}{x}h7! (Houdini), pocketing a pawn and preventing discovered checks. No shame in missing that! The other option, 28. #f6?, might look good after 28...罩g5 29.彎d4+ 當h5+ 30.當h1 - White seems to have weathered the storm, as he did in the line I calculated with White's pawn on e5. But because that pawn is now on d6, the heavy rains continue: 30...\equive 8!! (Houdini) threatens 31...₩a8+ and forces 31.₩d1+ ዿg4.



analysis diagram

The great Houdini then gives two nifty lines, ending in draws:

A) 32.豐f1 豐e4+ 33.豐g2 皇f5! 34.豐f3+ 豐xf3+ 35.틸xf3 皇e4 36. af1 ad5 37. g1 &xf3 38. axf3 axd6. draw: and

B) 32. #d2 #e4+ 33. #g2 #d5! (but not 33... &h3?? 34. #xg5 mate) 34. #f2 &f3 35.c4 #g5 36. #ag1. Now Black takes twice on g2 and makes a perpetual with his queen on e1 and e4.

27... 對xc3 28. 對d1+ 當h4 29. 互f4+ Forcing the king to g5, where Black's rook wants to be. 29... 當g5 30. 互f3!

Now White is simply the exchange up: 1-0 (51). Black's attack is over, and he cannot take the e-pawn and survive: 30...營xe5 31.營d2+ 含g4 (if 31...⊈h4, then 32.₩f2+ wins after either 32...\$\ddot\gamma 33.��e1!) 32.��g3+ ��f5 (32...��h4 33.營b4+! mates) 33.營f2+ 營f4 (or 33...\$e6 34.\$\bar{\textbf{2}}e1) 34.\$\bar{\textbf{2}}f3 \$\bar{\textbf{2}}g5+\$ 35.⊈h1 and White wins. That game was hard work, but it seemed easy by interzonal standards. Afterwards, my opponent and I looked at it. To me, it seemed obvious that Afifi needed a new opening. Afifi, however, blamed his troubles on his 15th move.



Position after 15. \$h6-e3

In the post-mortem, Afifi sensibly tried 15... 2c7 (instead of 15... 2c6). I don't recall what lines we looked at, but in one key position, Afifi slid his knight from e5 back to f7. Then he tapped on the knight with his index finger. 'Very strong piece,' he said, with feeling.

For a moment, I studied that knight on f7. Then I studied Afifi's face. Was he joking? A very strong piece? That knight? I try not to laugh at my opponents after I beat them, so I maintained a poker face. But I found Afifi's opinion to be absurd. My overall feeling was: this guy is a terrible player.

However, the more we looked at the position, the more I thought that Afifi had a point. On f7, the knight prevents \$\Delta\$h6 and helps defend Black's kingside; the knight stops 🙎 d5 from being a check; if Black plays ...e7-e6, then the knight protects d6; and, finally, the knight may later return to e5 in order to harass White's c4-pawn under better circumstances. After some more analysis, Afifi repeated his verdict: 'Very strong piece.' Again, he tapped on the knight. Life goes on. But a few days later, I saw a surprising sight: Vasily Smyslov, visibly irritated! 'I could literally count the number of times I saw him angry,' said Smyslov's old friend Genna Sosonko.24 The aging

World Champion was conducting a post-mortem – with Afifi.

Game 8

Vasily Smyslov Assem Afifi 2570 2400

Manila izt 1990 (12)



Position after 15. 拿f4 響c7 16. 罩e1

Their game continued
16...公f7! 17.營e2 e6 18.ℤad1 含g7
19.營d2 e5 20.兔e3 營xc4 21.f3
營c7 22.g4 ℤh4 23.兔d5 h5 24.兔xf7
含xf7 25.兔g5 ℤh3 26.營xd6 營xd6
27.ℤxd6 ℤxf3 28.ℤd8 含e6 29.ℤe8+含d6 30.ℤd8+½-½

Six years earlier, Smyslov had been a Finalist in the Candidates Matches; the man who vied for the title in 1954 (and won it in 1957) missed vying for it again, 30 years later, only because of that upstart from Baku, Garry Kasparov. But neither Botvinnik nor Kasparov had taught Smyslov how to overcome that very strong piece!

Genna Sosonko, The World Champions I Knew (Alkmaar, The Netherlands: New in Chess, 2013), p. 116.

CHAPTER 9

Blunders

Best Lesson

When you see a good move, sit on your hands. So goes the saying from the Soviet School of Chess – and so true! The best lesson I ever got was at age 9. I had known the moves for only a year, but I was beating Birmingham, Alabama's fifth-best player in the city championship round-robin tournament.

Game 48 Michael Thornton Stuart Rachels

1776 USCF

Birmingham, Alabama 1979



Position after 30... \$ f7-f8

'Troton' threw everything at my king, but his attack fell short. The sacrifices had been exciting, and so all the best players in the city had gathered around our board. Desperately, White tried **31..**f5. Now 31...豐xf5+ (or even 31...宣f4+) is mate in two, but I was so excited that I didn't even look at White's move. Instead, I dashed out **31...豐a6+ 32.c4 dxc4**. After punching the clock, I glanced up at Kyle Therrell — his approval meant

the most to me in the room. But Kyle was turning away and shaking his head. What's that all about?

32. \(\hat{2} \) h6 mate.

White's bishop seemed to come zooming out of nowhere. It shattered me. I'm not sure when I wrote 'B-R6 mate!' in jagged letters on my scoresheet, but seconds after the blow, I jumped up and ran outside. I was crying hysterically and was as angry as I could be. My father, who was directing the event, hustled out after me. As I stormed down the sidewalk, he managed to catch up with me, but I was unfit for human company. He had to shout just to be heard over my hysterics. At one point, he got a step ahead of me and turned around – jogging backwards past the imposing concrete streetlights on University Boulevard – and held up his hands, displaying his palms, so I could punch at them like a little boxer. 'Sometimes winning feels bad,' Michael Thornton said to the other players after I stormed out. But within a few months, I understood

that this was the best thing that had happened to me as a player. Before this game, I often moved impulsively; I was an energetic little boy. But afterwards, I never did. One trauma cured me.

Post-Thornton, I always performed a neurotic last-moment blunder check. If I wasn't in time trouble or playing prepared moves, I would try to clear my head after deciding on my move — but before playing it — and ask myself, 'Is there anything obvious I'm missing?' Thanks to this habit, I almost never hung pieces in rated games. And I never again got checkmated — not once. I always resigned first.

Hands Held High

One player who watched my debacle was Jack Gwin. Five years later, he had his own rough moment.

Game 49

Stuart Rachels

Jack Gwin

1996 USCF

Midfield 1984



Position after 34. \(\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
\begin{al

Jack had been outplaying me, but now he played 34... 2xe3??. After **35.fxe3+**, he picked up his queen and took my rook on h2. Getting mated felt disconcerting, even though I knew it wasn't real. 'I'm sorry Jack; you're in check,' I said. Chuckling in surprise, Gwin quickly changed his move to **35... ?e7**. In the confusion, it didn't occur to me that he'd been required to play either 35...\left\text{\mathbb{@}} f2+ or 35... ₩f5 because he'd touched his queen. Nor did I notice the amusing possibility of winning a rook with 36.₩xa2. But no matter; after **36.□xc2 □cxc2 37.₩b4+**. Black resigned.

Jack's blunder had the same cause as mine: tunnel vision brought on by excitement. I got so excited about playing 31... #a6+ that I couldn't see the kingside; Gwin got so excited about 34... *\(\tilde{\Omega}\) xe3 that he couldn't see the f-file. Sit on your hands.

Sucker

Game 50 Nimzowitsch Defence

Stuart Rachels

2204 USCF

Ed Gaillard Chicago 1989 (3)

In the third round of the 1989 U.S. Open, a master played a funny opening against me:



Black played these moves confidently; obviously, he was ready for 5. 2xd5. Only in a mousetrap can you find free cheese. Equally obvious was the advantage I could get after 5.f4 4b6 6.\(\hat{2}\)e3: Black is cramped, and his bishop cannot escape to f5 because 7.g4! would increase White's spatial advantage. In fact, my position after 5.f4 4b6 6.\(\)e3 would be so comfortable that I would already be a heavy favorite to win, given that I outrated my opponent by about 350 points. But what about that d-pawn? I've never refused a gift; if it's free, it's for me. So I started looking. After 5. 2xd5: 5…e6 is harmless; 5…∕∆dxe5 6.dxe5 loses a piece; and 5...\Db6 6.\Dxb6 axb6 7.\(\existseq\)e3 is the worst gambit I've ever seen. As the tree told the lumberjack, I was stumped! For the life of me, I couldn't see a price tag on that pawn. So I played 5. 公xd5??,

and after

5...Ødb8!

I wanted to hide under a pile of coats. I'm losing back the pawn, the queens are coming off, and it's dead equal. After 6. 公e3 營xd4


7. 對xd4 公xd4 8.g3, I played a lot of moves but eventually conceded the draw.

Welcome Interruption

Game 51
Stuart Rachels
Charles Hall

2036 USCF

Hollywood 1985



Position after 21... \wodeyedge c8-d8

I had been aiming for this position. I intended to play 22.位c7 in order to win Black's b-pawn after 22...\(\bigsiz c8\) 23. 學xb7 or 22... 罩b8 23. 臭a7. But. then I noticed 22... Zc8 23. Wxb7 lose material. Ugh! Now what? I could sacrifice the exchange in this variation with 24.\(\mathbb{I}\)xc5. Or I could just retreat my knight now - should I move it to d4, or must it come back to c3? As I sat there, I realized that I had botched the opening; my advantage was gone. In fact, I was becoming quite annoyed with myself, when my thoughts were interrupted by my opponent's resignation. Apparently, he thought 22.9 c7 was decisive.

with Muhammad Ali's rope-a-dope strategy (Foreman-Ali, Zaire 1974), a defender in chess must stay alert, waiting for a chance to become active.

25... **Zgg3** 26.d4



26...�h7!

Black doesn't rush to cash in by taking the f-pawn. I'm helpless, so Denton adds his queen and knight to the attack. Admittedly, he misses the beautiful 26...公xe4!! 27.fxe4 全f3+! 28.罩xf3 罩xh2+! 29.\$xh2 豐h4 mate (Houdini). However, 26...公h7! is good enough.

27. Qe2 營h4

Threatening to take on f3 with either piece; for after 28... \(\hat{2}xf3+29.\hat{2}xf3 \)\(\bar{2}xf3 \)\(\bar

31. \$\delta 91 \$\overline{\text{\te\

Down two pawns and bound in knots, I threw in the towel. Houdini assesses the final position as '-22', meaning 'Black's position is like being 22 pawns up.' For me, losing was never the emotional opposite of winning. Losing was wretched; winning was just relief. Well done, Tom! But let's look at a

Seventeens

different game, please ...

Game 93

Stuart Rachels (age 17; 2541 USCF) **Zsuzsa Polgar** (then-IM; age 17; 2495) New York 1987 (7)

The Polgar sisters from Hungary – Susan, Sophia, and Judit – are the most famous female players in history. Judit is still the best woman ever, and Susan was second when she retired. I'll call Susan 'Zsuzsa' because that is her original, Hungarian name, which I've always called her by. 'Zsuzsa' is not hard to say (twice you make the 'zh' sound in 'massage'), and it has more zing and zip than 'Susan'.

Zsuzsa is five months my elder, and so we might have played in some world youth championship. Instead, we were paired in a monstrously strong New York Open. Before the game, we chatted pleasantly – two 17-year-olds who had just met – and I asked her why her English was so good. 'Oh,' she replied modestly, 'I have visited the States many times.' My goodness, I thought; if I had visited Budapest 'many times', I don't think I'd be sitting here, chatting in Hungarian!... But maybe Zsuzsa studied English as part of her intensive upbringing. I don't know; I like Polgar games more than Polgar books.

Zsuzsa and I never became friends, but I have one fond memory of her. In Adelaide, Australia, a year after this game occurred, she and I played tennis on an off-day during the World Junior Championship. The court was secluded, so once we started playing, I felt cut off from the chess scene entirely. Zsuzsa is reputedly good at table tennis, but she was new to tennis; and so, like all beginners, she was at times comically bad – swinging and missing, or hitting the ball wildly off mark.

Until then, I had seen Zsuzsa in two modes: as a serious competitor (over the board) and as an articulate young woman (away from the board). But, as she floundered away on the tennis court, she was just cute. Sometimes, she giggled with embarrassment. Other times,

after a botched shot, she would hide her face in her hands and shake her head back and forth, as if to say, 'I'm so terrible, isn't it funny?' For a few hours, we were just teenagers.

In New York, however, we were opponents. At the top of my scoresheet, I wrote my USCF rating by my name, whereas I gave Zsuzsa her FIDE rating. I did this to make my rating seem higher than hers. However, my FIDE-strength was probably 50 points below hers. She was the better player, and I knew it. 1.e4 e5 2. 2f3 2c6 3. 2c4 2c5 4.c3 These days the world's elite are playing even more quietly, with 4.0-0 ♦ f6 5.d3. It must be hard to get an advantage against 2700s who are booked to the gills with computer lines.

4...**�**f6 5.d3 d6

Rejecting Kortchnoi's 5...a6! because she doesn't plan on playing ... \(\hat{2}a7. \)



6.0-0

Recent theory views 6.b4 \$\oxedextrm{\pmathbb{\qmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\qmanhbb{\pmathbb{\pmathbb{\qmanhbb{\pmathbb{\qmanhbb{\pmathbb{\qmanhbb{\qmanhbb{\pmathbb{\qmanhbb{\qmanhbb{\qmanhbb{\qmanhbb{\q\qmanhbb{\qmanhbb{\q\qanhbb{\qmanhbb{\q\qnanhbb{\qmanhbb{\qmanhbb{\qmanh

6...0-0 7.b4 ዿb6 8.Øbd2 a5

In general, the Quiet Piano promises White a long game but no advantage. With 8...a5, Zsuzsa embarks upon an enterprising plan of development, which was new to me. Also fine was 8...a6, even though the move is illogical; if Black is going to play ...a7-a6, then she should play it on move five, to let her bishop reach a7 in one go.

9.b5 Øe7 10. âb3 c6

So now the bishop can go to c7 after 2c4. Black could even omit ...c7-c6 and allow 2xb6 cxb6 - but most players like to keep their bishops. **11.bxc6 bxc6 12.**2c4 **2c7 13.**2c4



13...夕g6?!

Developing with 13... \(\hat{L}\)a6 is better. However, Zsuzsa wanted to attack my king, so she wasn't eager to commit her bishop to the queenside.

14.d4?!

Premature. I missed Black's reply. After the game, I thought I'd missed a good move: 14. 2a3, exerting pressure on Black's d-pawn. However, after 14... 2a6 (ready to meet 15. 2a4 with 15... 2b5) White has little.

Instead, White can take advantage of 13... 26?! with 14. 24! – the attack on c6 is awkward for Black: 14...c5 permanently weakens b5 and d5, while protecting c6 is passive (White is better after 14... 2b7 15. 2b1 2b8 16. 2a3).

14... ≜a6!

Threatening 15...a4, winning a piece – because my d-pawn no longer defends my knight.

Thus Zsuzsa completes her development, without letting me complete mine.

Black will have the initiative for the next 40 moves.

15.dxe5

A natural alternative is 15.a4, stopping 15...a4 and preparing 16.\(\hat{a}\)a3. However, Black may play either 15...\(\hat{a}\)xc4 16.\(\hat{a}\)xc4 \(\hat{a}\)xe4 15.\(\hat{a}\)xe4 d5 or 15...\(\hat{a}\)xe4 16.\(\hat{a}\)xe4 d5 17.\(\hat{a}\)e1 \(\hat{a}\)xc4. Having overlooked 14...\(\hat{a}\)a6, I was quick to conclude that these lines favor Black, so I decided to dissolve the tension with 15.dxe5. This is typical chess psychology: I was rattled, so I chose the safest course.

In fact, my move is correct, but only just; 15.dxe5 is equal, as is 15.a4 ②xe4 (with best play!), whereas 15.a4 ②xc4! favors Black slightly. Let's see why. First, on 15...②xe4, a critical position arises on 16.②cxe5! ②xc3! (after 16...dxe5? 17.⑤xe4, White's light-squared bishop is much stronger than Black's) 17.②xf7 ⑤xf7 ⑥xf7 18.⑥xf7+ (18.⑥c2 d5! equalizes – Houdini) 18...⑤xf7 19.⑥c2 ②d5.



analysis diagram – showing how equality results from 15.a4 \(\infty\)xe4.

In this tactically pregnant position, my analysis diverges from the computer's. (What a surprise.) I thought I'd found a nice line: 20.營xc6 ②ge7 21.董xe7+! ②xe7 22.②g5+ ��g8 23.譽e4! ②c4! 24.譽xh7+ ��f8 25.譽h8+ ②g8 26.董a3! with a ferocious attack. However, 20.譽xc6 ②b4! (instead of 20...②ge7?) favors Black (Houdini). Best is 20.譽f5+! ��g8 21.譽e6+ ��h8 22.②g5 譽f6 23.②f7+ ��g8 24.②h6+ with a draw by perpetual check (because 24...��f8?? 25.譽g8 mate favors White).

Yet Black is better after 15.a4 ②xc4! 16.②xc4 ②xe4 17.③xe4 d5 – he wins back the piece, and White will have to work to recoup his pawn, because 18.③xd5?! exd5 and 19...e4 obviously favors Black. Correct is 18.③g5 ③c8 19.⑤e1 dxc4 20.⑥e2 (Houdini). Of some interest, however, is my heroic exchange sacrifice (after 15.a4 ③xc4! 16.③xc4 ④xe4 17.⑤xe4 d5), which the machine scoffed at: 18.⑥a2? dxe4 19.⑥g5 (threatening 20.⑥h5) 19...h6 20.⑥xe4. White's bishop on a2 is worth a rook – or so

I thought – but after 20...exd4, the tactics favor Black because White is not fully developed: 21.豐h5 (21. exd4 鱼xh2+! nets a pawn due to 22...豐h4+ and 23...豐xe4) 21...豐h4! 22.豐xg6 豐xh2+ 23.壹f1 豐h1+ 24.壹e2 d3+! and White goes down (Houdini).

15...dxe5 16. **營e2**

I knew it looked funny to walk into a pin, but the pin is harmless. White's knight on c4 is hard to attack, and White can reinforce it.

16...₩c8

A sly move, although nothing was wrong with 16... d7 or 16... e7. From c8, the queen spies my kingside and avoids confronting my rooks on the open files.

17.a4 h6



Keeping my bishop and knight off of g5.

An artful move, breaking the pin and putting indirect pressure on f7. The drawback is that the queen has left the kingside.

18...**∲**h8

Vacating the a2-g8 diagonal. No one knows how the game will develop, but Zsuzsa's 18...\$h8 shows

aggressive intentions; she hopes to play ...f7-f5 later.

19. **≜**a3

This felt like the right square for the bishop. Also, I must admit that I liked the odd configuration of my queenside forces. Yet Black's knight can now settle on f4, and my pieces on the a-file cannot defend my king. Instead, 19. ≜d2 would have maintained the tension. Black can lash out with 19... ♠h5, but I can regroup with 20. ♠e3. All eight minor pieces and all six major pieces are still on the board; the game is wide open.

19...≌d8



20. 公cd2?

Why retreat a well-placed piece? Not only was my knight active on c4, but now Black can play the powerful 20... £64 without fear of 21. £65.

 equality after 20... 421. 24. But Black's attack is too strong. Correct was 20. 441 421. 21. 2xd1! with equality (Houdini).

20...公f4 21. 皇c4

Anyone who would contemplate 21. ≜xf7 ≝g4 22.g3 has poor survival instincts.



21... **₩**g4

The game has reached its climax. Black should win – but does not. To anticipate matters, after 22.g3, Black repeats the position (22...心h3+23.堂g1 ②f4+24.堂g1) and then plays 24...②d3 25.董e3 ②xf2!? 26.堂xf2 ②b6. That position is certainly dangerous for White, but shouldn't Black bring every piece into the attack before resorting to unclear sacrifices? Why not intensify Black's attack?

of Black's attack after two plausible alternatives to 23. \(\exists c5:\)

A) 23.豐xf7 豐g4 24.g3 豐h3!
25.gxf4 皇xf2+! 26.ዽxf2 (26.ዽh1 置xd2! 27.ఄ分xd2 分g4 28.分f1 豐f3
mate) 26...分g4+ 27.ዽe2 (if 27.ዽg1 置xd2! wins) 27...豐g2+ 28.ዽd1 豐xf3+, winning (Houdini); and
B) 23.h3 分xh3+! 24.gxh3 豐xh3
25.皇c5 皇xc5 26.豐xc5 分h5!
27.豐xe5 豐g4+ 28.ዽf1 (28.ዽh1 置xd2! 29.夕xd2 分f4 30.置g1 豐h4 mate) 28...分f4 29.罩e3 豐h3+
30.ዽe1 分g2+ 31.ዽe2 公xe3 32.ዽxe3 置xd2 33.ዽxd2 豐xf3, winning (Houdini).

Yet Zsuzsa's natural choice – 21... ∰g4 – should also have won. **22.g3** ②h3+

Black may again win by adding her dark-squared bishop to the 24.公xe5 豐h3! 25.gxf4 公g4 26.公xg4 (on 26.�df3 ≜xf2+ 27.�h1 ᡚxe5 28.∕2xe5 ≜xe1, Black wins due to the threat of 29... Zd2) 26... wxg4+ 27.�f1 罩xd2 28.罩e2 豐h3+ 29.�g1 ≜xf2+!! (devastating!) 30.\sigmaxf2 (30.罩xf2 營g4+ 31.當f1 罩ad8 leaves White defenseless) 30... \alphaad8!, and White is overwhelmed. Black's immediate threat is 31...\wxx\n2+ 32. \$\displaystyle{\text{\$\pi}\$} \tilde{\text{\$\pi}} 8d3+, and 31. \tilde{\text{\$\pi}} ae1 \tilde{\text{\$\pi}} 8d3 32.罩xd2 xh2+ 33.�f1 罩f3+ 34.罩f2 ጃxf2 is mate (Houdini). Black also has a problem-like way to

Black also has a problem-like way to try to win, but White has a problem-like defense: 22... Zxd2!? 23. 2xd2 Wh3 24.gxf4 2g4 and now:



analysis diagram – showing why 22... \(\sum x\d2!? \) would not have won.

- A) After the 'automatic' 25.公f1, White is in big trouble after 25... exf4 (threatening 26...f3): 26.f3 ②b6+ 27.公e3 (or 27.含h1 公f2+ 28.含g1 豐xf3 and then mate) 27...公xe3 28.②xa6 公c2+ 29.含h1 豐xf3 mate;
- B) However, White equalizes with 25. ②c5! (guarding f2 instead of h2). The line is nifty: 25...豐xh2+ 26.當f1 ②d6! 27.②b6! c5! 28.當e2 豐xf2+ 29.當d1 exf4 30.③xa6 冨xa6 31.②c4 豐f3+ 32.豐e2 豐xc3 33.冨c1 豐b3+ 34.豐c2 豐f3+ 35.豐e2 豐b3+ with a draw by perpetual check (this b-line is Houdini's). Close, but no cigar! When Tal was asked about combinations that don't work, he sighed. 'Everyone has a wife who's left them,' he said. 136

23.⊈g2 ②f4+

The best move, aiming to return to 24.當g1 皇xc4 25.豐xc4 皇b6!, as discussed.

However, Black also had a strong continuation that does not involve ... \(\hat{\pm} \) b6. On a good day, a strong

¹³⁶ Genna Sosonko, The World Champions I Knew (Alkmaar, The Netherlands: New in Chess, 2013), p. 173.

attacker might find it through a combination of calculation and intuition. Initially, the role of calculation is just to confirm that Black has no obvious forced win, given the current balance of attacking and defending forces. However, intuitively, the win feels very close – White's defense seems to succeed just barely. How, then, can Black soften White up, so that the next round of calculations might be more gratifying? Even without seeing things to the end, Black might consider 23...ዿxc4 24.xc4 罩xd2 25.ຝxd2 \(\beta\)d8. With these last two moves. Black has traded his rook on a8 for White's knight on f3. Thus, Black has swapped an inactive piece for a defending piece – and given White's precarious position, this tips the scales. On 26.\(\beta\)a2 \(\Delta\)h5! (throwing another piece on the fire) 27.f3 29...\wxf3+ leads to checkmate. So. White should play 26. \alphae e2 because then 26...�h5 27.f3 罩xd2?? isn't check but allows 28.fxg4. Black may then play 26...�f4+ 27.�f1 ᡚxe2 28.營xe2 營h3+ 29.壹e1 (not 29.壹g1 \mathbb{Z} xd2! – a reprise of 24... \mathbb{Z} xd2 – 30.\\xd2 \@g4 31.f3 \&b6+ and wins) 29...∅g4 30.≜c5 ∅xh2 (Houdini) – Black is a pawn up.

24.**ġg1** ⁄∆d3?

Now the position is equal. During the game, however, I saw none of Black's wins, and so 24...②d3 seemed like a strong, fighting move – Zsuzsa is showing who's boss by forging ahead with her knight and declining to repeat moves.

25.**⊑**e3

Playing 25. ②xd3 and 26. ③xf7 seemed out of the question against a strong tactician. If nothing else, Black can play 25... ②xd3 26. ③xf7 ⑤xf7 ⑥xff 27. ⑤xff 27. ⑥xff 27. ⑥xff

Now I needn't fear 25...\$b6?!, because after 26.\(\bar{L}\)xd3 \(\bar{L}\)xd3 \(\

25...Øxf2!

Forceful play. For a moment, I thought of Fischer's combination against Robert Byrne, which also began with ... 2xf2!, though the positions are much different. I had seen this sacrifice coming but didn't know where it would lead.

26. \ xf2

Finally, a piece is captured – move 26 is rather late!

26...**.**≜b6



¹³⁷ See Bobby Fischer, My 60 Memorable Games (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969; Batsford edition, 2008), p. 300.

Black has sacrificed a knight for a pawn, and she can win back the exchange at any time. According to the standard point system (in which a rook = 5 points and a bishop or knight = 3 points), a rook and pawn are equal in value to a bishop and knight. In practice, the bishop and knight are often better, but here the open files might favor Black's rooks.

First, however, we must see whether I get pasted.

27.**□ae1 營h3 28.눻g1 ②g4 29.②f1**A solid defense. Black can now equalize, if she desires, with
29....**②**xe3 30.**②**xe3 **②**xc4 31.**③**xc4 **③**xe3+ 32.**□**xe3 **□**d1+ 33.**□**e1 **□**xe1+ 34.**②**xe1 **□**b8 35.**◎**d3 **□**b3 36.**②**c1 (Houdini).

29... **營h**5!



Polgar doesn't want to cash out, but she can't add any pieces to the attack, so she retreats her queen in order to threaten 30... 2xe3 31. 2xe3 \(\vert \text{xf3} \). She also sets two traps. The first felt like a sucker's play: on 30. \(\vert \text{xf7} \) g6!, White faces the double threat of 31... \(\vert \text{xr3} \) and the still-possible 31... \(\vert \text{xr3} \) xe3 \(\vert \text{xf3} \). The second trap is sprung

on 30. \$\delta g2\$, breaking the pin and defending my knight: 30... \$\delta xc4\$
31. \$\delta xc4 \delta xe3\$ 32. \$\delta xe3 \delta xh2!\$, winning a pawn (on 33. \$\delta xh2? \$\delta d2+\$ wins) and preparing the way for a lethal ... \$\delta d2\$.

So, what should I do?

30. **≜c1?**!

I was fond of this move, which brings the bishop into the defense. The idea is that after 30... 2xe3 31. \(\hat{\pma}\) xe3, Black cannot win a piece because her bishop on b6 is hanging 32.\(\bar{\pi}\)xe3). Very crafty, I felt. However, neither trap Zsuzsa set was real, and my move comes in third. After 30.曾g2!? এxc4 31.豐xc4 ②xe3?, White eschews 32. ②xe3? ②xh2! in favor of 32.h3!! (Houdini). I cannot remember seeing such a thing – White declines to recapture a bishop in order to threaten a lowly knight, which is protected! By a strange circumstance of geometry, 32... \(\)b6? 33.hxg4 loses for Black because after 33...\subseteq xg4 (or 33... ₩g6) 34. ②xe5, she cannot prevent both 35. 2xg4 and 35. 2xf7+. Nor can she play the aggressive 32...∕∆f2? because her knight gets in 34.\dightarrow xf2 or 33...\dightarrow xh3 34.\dightarrow h1 or 33...∕\(\text{\Q}\)d3 34.\(\text{\Z}\)d1). In these lines, White's minor pieces cover all the right squares. So Black must do something else after 32.h3!! – for example, 32...f5 or 32...\(\mathbb{L}\)f4 or 32...∕∑h2. Incredibly, White should win in each line. Sparing you the details, look at how bad Black is

doing after 32... 66 33. 2xe3: White threatens 34.g4 \$\mathbb{@}g6 35. 2xe5; White's minor pieces are stronger than Black's rooks; and White's pieces deny those rooks the possible entry-points of b2 and d2. After 32.h3!!, Black's queen turns out to be misplaced, whereas White's is sitting pretty on c4.

In practice, White would probably win after 30. \$\disp2\$, so long as he saw 32.h3. Yet Black can get a small edge with 30... \$\dispxc4\$ 21. \$\dispxc4\$ \$\omega\$ xe3 +! (instead of 31... \$\dispxc4\$ 32. \$\omega\$ xe3 \$\dispxc3\$ xe3 \$\dispxc3\$ xe3 \$\dispxc3\$ xe3 \$\dispxc4\$ xe3 \$\dispxc4\$ xe3 \$\dispxc2\$ xe3 \$\d

The first point is that 31...公xe3?? 32.皇f6+ 曾h7 33.皇g8+! 置xg8 34.豐f7+ forces mate. So Black plays 31...皇xf1, when 32.豐e6!! (Houdini) brings the battle to fever pitch. The material is equal, and the attacks balance out. A logical conclusion is 32...皇xe3+33.置xe3 量d1 34.皇f6+ ②xf6 35.豐xf6+ 曾h7 36.皇b3! 罩c1! (36...罩d7? 37.曾xf1 wins) 37.豐e7+ 曾h8 38.豐f6+ with a draw by perpetual check (Rachels).

30... \(\hat{\pm}\) xc4?!

Zsuzsa believes me – her mistake. She should've won my c-pawn with 30.... \(\times \text{xe3} \)! 31.\(\times \text{xe3} \) \(\times \text{xf3} \) 32.\(\times \text{xb6} \) \(\times \text{xc3} \) 33.\(\times \text{xa6} \) \(\times \text{xe1} \) 34.\(\times \text{xd8} \) \(\times \text{xd8} \) \(\times \text{xd8} \) \(\times \text{tad8} \) \(\text{timits Black's advantage,} \)

whereas 35. wxf7?! (opening the f-file) allows 35... b4!, making too many threats (... f8, ... b6+, ... 44+, ... xa4, and ... xe4; Houdini).

31. \wxc4 \(\partial xe3 + 32. \(\partial xe3 \)

Not 32. \triangle xe3?? \triangle xe3 33. Ξ xe3 Ξ d1+, winning a piece.

32... 2xe3 33. Exe3 Ed1

Zsuzsa is still playing energetically.



We've reached a major piece ending with roughly even material - White has two knights for a rook and pawn. White is no longer worse, but I still felt under pressure. I had to make seven moves in seven minutes (Zsuzsa had double that), and my king is not very safe. Black's last move, 33... Idl, invites me to play 34. ₩xc6 and to weather the storm after something like 34... \bullet b8 35. ∅3d2 or 34... ℤad8 35. ⊈f2. I did not want to defend such a position when 'the evil genie of time trouble hangs like a fearful apparition over the game (Kotov).'138 Instead, I sought to eliminate Black's active rook.

34.\(\mathbb{I}\)d3 \(\mathbb{I}\)a1!?

¹³⁸ Alexander Kotov, Play Like a Grandmaster (London: B.T.Batsford, 1978), p. 176.